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SELECTED TAX ASPECTS OF DIVORCE AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENTS
Alimony is awarded in relatively few divorce cases and when granted
the award is often for a small amount. However, in the relatively few
cases where alimony is involved it is an important issue because of the
conflicting interests of the parties. The husband seeks an arrangement
under which the alimony payments will be included in his wife's gross in-
come and deductible by him. The wife naturally desires an alimony ar-
rangement under which the payments will be excluded from her gross
income.
There are two principal types of alimony. The most common is that
which is regarded as a commutation of the husband's duty to support his
wife. The object is to leave the wife as well off during non-cohabitation
as she was during the marriage. The wife is usually awarded periodical
payments (these may or may not be the same as "periodic" payments
which will be discussed below in connection with section 71 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954). The second type of alimony is a principal
sum award. The theory of this form of alimony is a division of property
which leaves the wife about as well off as if her husband had died. The
latter theory of alimony prevails in Indiana.1 As a rule of thumb the
wife is given one-third of the husband's property, but this is only a start-
ing point to determine a fair property division.2 This type of alimony is
ordinarily awarded as a lump sum payment since it is in essence a division
of property, but the court may order the alimony to be paid in install-
ments.' As will be seen, in section 71 the distinction between the two
types of alimony is important to determine whether the husband may de-
duct the alimony payments.
In the following discussion of the tax consequences of alimony the
husband is considered the payor and the wife the recipient of the alimony,
but the same rules apply in the few situations where the wife is the payor
and the husband is the recipient.4
Deductibility of Alimony Payments
Section 71 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that
if the wife is divorced or legally separated from her husband under court
1. Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 132 N.E.2d 612 (1956).
2. Ibid.
3. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1218 (Burns 1965).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701 (a) (17).
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decree of divorce or separate maintenance, or if the wife is separated
from her husband and there is a written separation agreement, the wife's
gross income includes periodic payments, whether or not made at regular
periods (including payments attributable to property transferred in trust
or otherwise), received after such court decree or after execution of the
written separation agreement and which are made under the court decree
or separation agreement in discharge of a legal obligation arising from
the marital or family relationship. Section 71(c) (1) further provides
that installment payments discharging part of an obligation which is
stated as a principal sum in the decree or agreement shall not be treated as
periodic payments and thus are not included in the wife's gross income.
However, section 71 (c) (1) is modified by section 71(c) (2) in that in-
stallment payments of a principal sum are treated as periodic payments
and included in the wife's gross income if they are to be paid over a
period of more than ten years from the date of the decree or agreement.
But such payments are includible in the wife's gross income for any one
year only to the extent of ten percent of the principal sum.' Section 215
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code permits the husband to deduct only
those alimony payments which are included in the wife's gross income
under section 71.
The main problem presented by these sections is the meaning of the
term "periodic payment." As a general rule, alimony payments are not
periodic unless they are a series of payments indefinite in amount or dura-
tion.' The exact total amount which the husband will pay to his wife
must be indeterminable. If the payments are subject to certain conting-
encies, whether expressed in the agreement or decree or supplied by the
operation of state law, they are indefinite in amount and thus periodic.7
Thus, if the payments to the wife will terminate on the death of either
spouse, remarriage of the wife, or a change in economic circumstances of
either spouse, they are indefinite in duration and are periodic payments.
Likewise, if the husband is to pay a specified portion of his annual in-
come to the wife as alimony, such payments would b2 periodic since they
are indefinite in amount.
5. § 71(c) (2) provides that advance installment payments upon a principal sum
payable over a period of more than ten years are subject to thne ten percent limitation.
This section makes no explicit provision for delinquent payments of this nature. How-
ever, the Regulations § 1.71-1 (d) (2) state that "this ten per cent limitation applies to
installment payments made in advance but does not apply to delinquent installment pay-
ments for a prior taxable year of the wife made during her t-able years." The full
amount of delinquent payments is thus included in her gro. s income. Holahan v.
Commissioner, 222 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Lilet R. Reighley, 7 T.C. 344 (1951) ; Rev.
Rul. 55-457, 1955-2 CuMt. BULL. 527.
6. Renstrom v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 688 (D. Neb. 1963).
7. Eleanor Shoemaker v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 192 (1962).
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Thus, payments by the husband to the wife are not included in the
wife's gross income and are not deductible by the husband unless they are
part of a series of payments and of indefinite amount or duration. How-
ever, even if the total amount of the payments to the wife is determinable,
the payments are treated as periodic, subject to the ten percent limitation,
if they are payable over a period of more than ten years.8
The rationale for the rule that payments not subject to contingencies
and not for more than ten years duration are not periodic is that divorced
wives often receive considerable sums which are in the nature of a divi-
sion of property payable immediately to her in addition to regular, recur-
rent payments for her current support. Congress did not desire the wife
to be taxable upon the lump sum because of the burdensome tax she
would then have to pay in the year of the divorce. Congress considered
lump sum payments and payments upon a principal sum as something in
the nature of a division of capital rather than payments from the hus-
band's income as a commutation of his duty to support.9
Payments to the wife are not alimony unless the whole or a portion
of them inures to her exclusive benefit. The benefit to her cannot be
contingent. In divorce settlements it is common to find the husband
ordered to transfer the family residence to the wife or to give her a life
estate in it, make payments on the mortgage, pay real estate taxes, make
repairs, and maintain insurance on the house. The tax consequences of
such arrangements, whether the payments are alimony or merely a divi-
sion of capital, depend on how the legal title to the residence was held at
the time of the divorce and whether a limited or a complete divorce was
awarded. Where a decree of separate maintenance allowed the husband
to retain a fee simple interest in the family residence, but ordered him to
give exclusive possession of it to his wife and to make all payments on the
mortgage, neither the fair rental value of the house nor the mortgage
payments were held to be periodic payments.1" The granting to the wife
of the right to exclusive possession of the house, though it was in the
nature of an alimony payment, was considered a lump sum payment by the
court and not a periodic payment of the fair monthly rental since the hus-
band, in effect, conveyed a single right, i.e., a life estate to the wife.
8. If the court in a divorce decree orders the husband to pay a lump sum to his
wife by a certain date and the wife later in a private agreement with the husband per-
mits him to pay the obligation in installments extending over a period of more than ten
years instead of in a lump sum, the payments are not included in the wife's gross income
nor deductible by the husband. Lounsbury v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.
1963).
9. Renstrom v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 688 (D. Neb. 1963).
10. Gentry v. United States, 283 F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1960) ; James Bradley and Jane
Bradley v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 701 (1958).
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Mortgage payments on the house were held not to be periodic payments
because the husband still owned a fee simple in the house, and thus the
payments were more for the benefit of the husband to protect his title in
the house than for the benefit of the wife. In addition, the husband was
already obligated to pay the mortgage. If the wife either prior to or after
the divorce or separation had held a fee simple interest in the residence,
then the mortgage payments could be treated as periodic payments under
section 71 (c).
However, it is most common for the title to the family residence to
be held by neither the husband nor the wife alone, but rather jointly as
tenants by the entirety. In this situation, whether the husband can de-
duct mortgage payments, real estate taxes on the house, or insurance on
the house paid by him pursuant to the divorce decree depends on whether
the decree is one of limited or absolute divorce.
A decree of limited divorce does not dissolve the tenancy by the en-
tirety." Where property is held as tenants by entirety, the benefit inur-
ing to the wife from payments by the husband of taxes, insurance, and
mortgage installments, etc., on the house is contingent since she will re-
ceive the benefit only if she survives her husband. If she predeceases
him, complete title to the residence will pass to the husband, and he will
receive the benefit of the payments. Thus, when the husband is making
insurance, mortgage, etc., payments on property held by him and his wife
as tenants by the entirety, he is protecting his own interest in the prop-
erty; and any benefit to the wife is contingent upon her surviving him.
Since she does not receive exclusive benefit of any portion of payments,
such payments are not alimony payments.' 2
However, if the husband is ordered by an absolute divorce decree to
make mortgage, insurance, etc., payments on the residence held in tenancy
by entirety (prior to the divorce), one-half of these payments are alimony
payments deductible by the husband, if periodic or treated as periodic, be-
cause an absolute divorce decree dissolves a tenancy by entirety and con-
verts it into a tenancy in common." In a tenancy in common, there is no
11. Rev. Rul. 62-38, 1962-1 Cum. BULL. 15. It is clear ia Indiana that an absolute
divorce terminates a tenancy by the entirety and converts it i ato a tenancy in common.
INn. ANN. STAT. § 3-1218 (Burns 1965 Supp.). The cases in Indiana make it clear that
the reason for such termination is that the tenancy by the entirety is dependent on the
unity of the spouses by marriage and consequently anything which destroys that unity,
such as an absolute divorce, destroys such a tenancy and converts it into a tenancy in
common. Maitland v. Barley, 174 Ind. 620, 92 N.E. 738 (1910); Gibble v. Gibble, 111
Ind. App. 60, 40 N.F.2d 347 (1942) ; Kiracofe v. Kiracofe, 80 Ind. App. 656, 142 N.E.
21 (1924). However, since a limited divorce is a judicial separation of the spouses
which does not dissolve the marriage, it will not terminate tho tenancy by the entirety.
12. Rev. Rul. 62-38, 1962-1 Cum. BULL. 15.
13. Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 Cum. BuLL. 17.
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right of survivorship between the divorced parties as to this property since
each has a separate and distinct interest in one-half of the property. The
wife's interest in the property is not subject to divestment if she pre-
deceases her husband. When the husband makes mortgage, tax, and in-
surance payments on the property held as tenants in common, the wife
realizes an economic benefit to the extent of the portion of the payments
applicable to her one-half ownership of the property since the payments
increase her equity in her one-half interest and accrue to her sole benefit.' 4
A fairly common requirement of separation agreements and divorce
decrees is that the husband shall continue to pay premiums on his life in-
surance policy in which his wife is the beneficiary. Caution must be ex-
ercised when drafting such a requirement in the separation agreement if
one wants to assure that the husband will be able to claim such payments
as a deduction. When the husband is required by a divorce or separation
decree to keep in force a life insurance policy on his life with his wife as
beneficiary, the premiums paid by the husband are deductible by him and
included in the wife's gross income only if the payments inure to the sole
benefit of the wife and her interest is not merely a contingent interest in
the policy. Her interest becomes more than a mere contingent interest
by the husband irrevocably assigning all incidents of ownership in the
life insurance policy to the wife. She thus becomes the owner of the
policy and has complete control over who will be the beneficiary. In this
case, the premiums he pays pursuant to the divorce decree or separation
agreement are alimony payments deductible by him and included in his
wife's gross income since the wife receives the exclusive benefit of pay-
ments." Complete ownership of a policy consists of rights to borrow or
assign the policy, the right to change the beneficiary, and the right to the
benefits of the policy after death. The wife must have these rights in the
policy in order for payments of premiums by her husband to be considered
alimony payments.'" But if the wife is a mere contingent beneficiary of
14. Ibid. Utility payments by the husband to the wife on the residence, regardless
of whether held as tenancy by the entirety or tenancy in common, are alimony payments
if wife is in exclusive possession of the residence since the utility payments are expenses
for current enjoyment of the property and inure to her sole benefit.
15. Hyde v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Florence Griffith, 35
T.C. 882 (1961) ; Katherine Hyde, 36 T.C. 507 (1961) ; Estate of Bores Hart, 11 T.C.
16 (1948) ; Anita Q. Stewart, 9 T.C. 195 (1947). In determining the taxability of what
is received by the wife from the husband, the court is limited to the requirements of the
decree or separation agreement. Thus, if the husband transfers complete ownership of
a life insurance policy to his wife when the decree of separation agreement does not
require him to do so, the court will not hold the wife to possess complete ownership of
the policy and the premiums will not be included in her gross income nor deductible by
the husband. Florence Griffith, 35 T.C. 882 (1961).
16. Kiesling v. United States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1965); Griffith v. United
States, 245 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.J. 1965) ; Florence Griffith, 35 T.C. 882 (1961).
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the policy, she must outlive the husband to receive the benefits of the
policy. Therefore, the payments of premiums by the husband are not
alimony payments because the wife does not receive full and sole benefit
of the payments. The wife would receive no benefit from such a policy
if she predeceased her husband.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ha.s ruled that premium
payments are not periodic but installment payments of a principal sum
unless more than ten annual premium payments are due on the policy to
pay it up fully after its assignment to the wife. If more than ten annual
premiums are due, then they are deductible by the husband to the extent
of ten percent of the balance due on the policy.'" However, there does not
appear to be any basis for this limitation because payments of premiums
are truly periodic payments and not installment payments upon a princi-
pal sum. The total amount of premium payments that the husband will
make on the policy is indeterminable for, since they will cease upon his
death, they are of indefinite duration. There is rito ascertainable prin-
cipal sum.
Thus, in order for payments made by the husband to the wife pur-
suant to a divorce decree or separation agreement to be includible in the
wife's gross income and deductible by the husband they must be both
periodic payments and payments in the nature of alimony. In order for
payments to be periodic or treated as such they must be indefinite as to
amount or duration, or payable over a period of more than ten years.
Payments to the wife are alimony payments only to the extent that the
benefit to the wife from the payment is not contingent and goes solely to
her and not to the husband.'
Section 71 (b), which has been subjected to strict interpretation by
the courts, provides that payments to the wife for the support of minor
children of the husband are not included in the wife's gross income if
such payments are fixed by the separation agreemert or decree. Neither
are such payments deductible by the husband under section 215 since they
are not included in the wife's gross income. Alimony payments received
by the wife must be included in her gross income even though the divorce
decree or separation agreement states that payments are for support of
both the minor child and the wife unless it specifically states the exact
amount or percentage of payments that is to be used for child support.
It is not sufficient that the purpose is clear that part of the payments
17. Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950).
IS Where the husband uses annuity payments, the paymerts being made directly by
the company to the wife, to discharge his alimony obligations, such amounts are included
in the wife's gross income but are not deductible by the husband. Treas. Reg. §
1.71-1(c) (2) (1957).
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should be used for the support of minor children or that the portion of
payments allocable to child support can be computed from the language of
the decree or agreement.19
The Recognition of Gain Upon Lump
Sum Transfers of Appreciated Property
Prior to 1962 the lower federal courts were divided upon the issue of
whether there was a taxable event when the husband transferred appre-
ciated property under a separation agreement or divorce decree to his
wife in discharge of his marital obligations. In order to determine the
gain, if any, of the husband so as to render the transfer a taxable event,
the amount realized by the husband must be determined. The problem
centers around section 1001 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. Section
1001 (a) defines gain on the sale or other disposition of property as the
excess of the amount realized over the basis of the property exchanged.
Section 1001 (b) defines the amount realized as money plus fair market
value of any property received. A commonly accepted definition of fair
market value is ". . . the price at which property would exchange hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under compul-
sion to buy or sell."" This necessarily assumes the existence of a market,
but in the divorce situation there is no market in which similar items
(marital rights) are bought and sold from which a fair market value can
be determined. There is no buyer for the wife's marital rights other
than her husband. In addition, the husband and wife are not willing
buyers and sellers free from compulsion. By the very nature of divorce
or separation, the wife is compelled to sell and the husband is compelled
to buy her marital rights. There is clearly no fair market value of the
wife's marital rights-the amount realized by the husband-in the nor-
mal sense.
When the amount realized by a party has no readily ascertainable
value, it is accepted practice to presume that the values of the two prop-
erties exchanged in an arm's length transaction are equal.2 ' Several fed-
eral circuit courts and the Tax Court adopted this rule as the solution to
the valuation of the amount realized by the husband.2 They held that
19. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 291 (1961).
20. Estate of Fitts v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1956).
21. United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960) ; International
Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943); Philadelphia Park
Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
22. Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942); Commissioner v.
Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941) ; E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958) ; Estate of
Stouffer, 30 T.C. 1244 (1958); Christina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949);
Aledo N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
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the marital rights, i.e., amount realized, are equal in value to the property
transferred to the wife. For example, if in discharge of his marital ob-
ligation the husband transferred stock to his wife which had originally
cost him $5,000 but now had a fair market value of $20,000, he would
be taxed on a gain of $15,000.
However, other federal circuit courts, notably the Sixth Circuit in
Commissioner v. Marshman,22 refused to apply the arm's length presump-
tion of equal value. That court held that because the marital rights could
not be valued the transfer was not a taxable event. It is only when the
parties are dealing at arm's length with one another that equal value of
exchanged properties can be presumed. The Mars,'nnan court said that
it could not be presumed that the marital rights and the property trans-
ferred to the wife are of equal value. Furthermore it is unrealistic to
view a transaction between a husband and wife in contemplation of sepa-
ration or divorce as an arm's length transaction due to the great emotion
and tension involved in negotiations for divorce or separation agreements.
In the usual arm's length transaction, monetary considerations are para-
mount; the objective is normally to make a profit. This is not the case
in divorce negotiations where emotions so dominate the bargaining that
economic considerations are secondary.2" Frequently a large part of the
value of property transferred by the husband to the wife represents a bo-
nus which the husband is willing to pay to the wife to induce her coopera-
tion in terminating the marriage and to expedite the proceedings. The
husband may well agree to give the wife property in excess of the value
of marital rights, or the wife might be willing to accept less, both de-
pendent upon their individual desires to be rid of the other. Under these
circumstances, there is a substantial question whethcr there is actually an
arm's length transaction and reasonable assumption of equal value be-
tween the husband and wife where there is compulsion upon the husband
to buy and the wife to sell her marital rights due to the practical neces-
sity of terminating the marital relationship. It appears unrealistic to
presume that property transferred to the wife as a result of divorce settle-
ment is equal in value to the marital rights relinquished by the wife.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United
States;  overruled the holding of Marshman. Davis held that where the
23. 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960).
24. But see Note, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 425, 528 (1963) which observed that divorce
negotiations are usually conducted by attorneys in a business atmosphere, rather than
one embroiled in emotion. Often though, a spouse who desires to avoid prolonged
negotiations may instruct his attorney not to bicker, but to agre, to anything necessary to
obtain a speedy property settlement.
25. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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husband transfers property to his wife in release of his marital obliga-
tions pursuant to a separation agreement, the marital rights are presumed
to be equal in value to the property transferred to the wife, provided that
the value of the marital rights is not otherwise ascertainable. In this
case, the husband and wife entered into a separation agreement in which
the wife agreed to accept 1,000 shares of stock in the DuPont Corpora-
tion in full settlement and satisfaction of all claims and rights against
her husband. The stock was owned solely by her husband and had a cost
basis of $74,775. Pursuant to the agreement, the husband transferred
the stock to his wife at which time the stock had a fair market value of
$82,250. The Commissioner ruled that the husband had realized a long
term capital gain on the transfer, the amount realized by the husband be-
ing an amount equal to the present value of the transferred property.
In upholding the Commissioner, the Supreme Court said:
It must be assumed, we think, that the parties acted at arm's
length and that they judged the marital rights to be equal in
value to the property for which they were exchanged. There
was no evidence to the contrary here. (Emphasis added) . . .
To be sure there is much to be said of the argument that such
an assumption is weakened by the emotion, tension, and practi-
cal necessities involved in divorce negotiations and property
settlements arising therefrom. However, since it is recognized
that the transfer was a taxable event, it is more consistent with
the general purpose and scheme of the taxing statutes to make a
rough approximation of the gain realized thereby than to ignore
altogether its tax consequences.26
Thus, while the court recognized that the arm's length assumption of
equal value is weakened in divorce situations by emotions and tensions
inherent in divorce negotiations, it held, as a matter of tax policy, that the
marital rights must be valued by some method even if it is only a rough
approximation. Since there was no other means of valuing the marital
rights, the court sanctioned the arm's length assumption of equal value.
The Davis holding does not require the equal value assumption to be
applied in all cases, but only where the value of the marital rights is not
otherwise ascertainable. The Court held that the transfer of appreciated
property to the wife pursuant to the divorce or separation cannot be al-
26. Id. at 72. The last sentence of the quoted material appears to rest on circular
reasoning. In that sentence the Court said that once it is recognized that the transac-
tion was a taxable event, the amount realized must be valued even if only by rough
approximation. But you cannot ascertain whether the transaction is a taxable event un-
til the value of the amount realized is determined.
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lowed to escape tax consequences; the marital rig:hts must always be
valued even if only by a rough approximation. After stating that it must
be assumed that the marital rights were judged by the parties to be equal in
value to the transferred property, the Court said, "There was no evidence
to the contrary here."27 The Court thus leaves the way open to refute
the presumption of equal values by presentation of evidence, other than
the evident emotions and tensions incident to divorce, of the true value
of the marital rights. It appears that if the equal value assumption is to
be avoided by the introduction of evidence refuting this assumption, that
evidence must show an acceptable alternative method of valuing marital
rights. It would be fruitless to show evidence rebutting the presumption
of equal value if that evidence did not establish an acceptable alternative
valuation of marital rights, for the court would probably be forced to
utilize the equal value assumption due to the necessity of fixing some
value to marital rights to preclude the transfer from escaping the income
tax. Thus, in situations where pursuant to a divorce decree the husband
transferred appreciated property to his wife in discharge of his marital
obligations and there was no separation agreement between the parties
providing for the exchange, the Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals have held that the marital rights are equal in value to trans-
ferred property thus resulting in a capital gain to the husband on the
transfer..21 It is clear that in this situation there was no arm's length
transaction between the husband and wife since the transfer was not
negotiated by them but was ordered by the divorce court. The arm's
length assumption of equal value dearly is inapplicable in such circum-
stances, but since there is no other means of valuing the marital rights,
the exchange would avoid tax consequences altogetl~er if the equal value
assumption was not applied. Therefore, a showing that there was no
arm's length negotiations does not establish the rceed for some other
method of valuation; and, in such a case, marital rights must still be
presumed to be equal in value to transferred property. This is necessary
in order to comply with the mandate of the Davis case that marital rights
be valued by some means even if it is only by rough approximation.
However, if it is shown that the husband and wife in the separation
agreement assigned a value to the marital rights which were to be re-
leased in exchange for the transfer of property to the wife, this would
certainly be sufficient evidence to rebut the equal value assumption.
Davis would not require that the marital rights be valued as equal to the
27. Ibid.
28. Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964) ; Robert K. Stevens, 38
T.C. 345 (1962).
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transferred property since this value can be ascertained by reference to
the separation agreement. Thus, the husband can avoid or minimize his
gain on the transfer of appreciated property to the wife by obtaining his
wife's cooperation in setting the value of the marital rights equal to his
basis for the transferred property, or at least a value between his basis
and the fair market value of the property so as to minimize his gain.
The Court will accept the value assigned to marital rights by the parties
as long as the value is not unreasonable.29 Of course if a value lower
than fair market value is assigned to the property, the wife will take a
lower basis than under Davis principles and taxable gain will be shifted to
her and postponed until disposition by her."0
The equal value assumption of the Davis case might be applied in
Burnet v. Logan31 situations. In the Logan case, Mrs. Logan owned
stock in the Andrews & Hitchcock Iron Company. This company owned
twelve percent of the stock of the Mahoning Ore & Steel Company, which
had a ninety-seven year lease upon an iron mine. The latter company had
an agreement with the former company to deliver twelve percent of the
extracted ore to the former company. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Com-
pany purchased all the stock of the Andrews Company, including the stock
held by Mrs. Logan, paying Mrs. Logan a specified amount of cash and
agreeing to pay her in the future sixty-seven cents for each ton of ore re-
ceived under the lease. The Court held that since the overall value of the
right to receive sixty-seven cents per ton of ore mined, i.e., the amount
realized, could not be determined, the sale was not, at that time, a taxable
event and no gain was realized at the time of the sale. The Court stated
that she would not realize a gain and need not report any income from the
sale until after her basis for the stock exchanged had been recouped. Thus,
the Court did not require the amount realized to be computed at the time
of the transfer. It did not require the value of the amount realized to be
equated with the value of the transferred property in order to compute
the gain as was done in the Davis case.
There is no inconsistency between the Davis and the Logan cases.
The essence of the rule of the Logan case is that where the amount
realized is not readily ascertainable, it need not be immediately deter-
29. It might at first glance seem plausible to value actuarily marital rights and
thus avoid resort to the arm's length assumption in order to value those rights. How-
ever, actuarial valuation of marital rights may not be practicable because of the many
uncertainties and contingencies upon which their value depends. One element of the
wife's marital rights is a right in the property acquired by the husband in the future,
but since there is no way of knowing what property the husband will acquire in the
future, this facet of marital rights is impossible to evaluate.
30. See discussion in text following note 32 infra.
31. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
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mined. Income need not be reported in the year of the exchange, but
rather, the reporting of the gain will be postponed until the taxpayer has
recouped his basis. This rule is not contra to the Davis doctrine. The
Davis case merely requires the amount realized to be valued in the year
of the exchange by an assumption of equal value between the exchanged
properties when there is no alternative means of valuation and when the
transfer would escape taxation altogether if this assumption was not util-
ized. But the Logan rule does not allow the transfer to escape taxation;
it merely allows the tax to be postponed until the taxpayer recoups his
basis and actually realizes a gain. The amount realized is ultimately
valued. It is apparent that the Logan rule is not applicable to transfers of
property in release of marital obligations as in the Davis case. The gain
on such a transfer must be taxed at the time of the transfer or it will
escape taxation altogether. Unlike the Logan situation it is not possible
to postpone the determination of gain to a future time and at that time
report it. The value of the amount realized will be no more determinable
at any future time than it is at the time of transfer.
Proper Date for Valuation of Marital Rights
When it is presumed that marital rights are equal in value to the
transferred property, as of what date should the marital rights be valued?
Should it be the value of the transferred property as of the date of trans-
fer or its value at the date of the separation agreement? Davis did not
consider this question. It merely upheld the Commissioner's determina-
tion which was based on the value of the stock on the date of the transfer.
However, to be consistent with the assumption of equality of value be-
tween the transferred property and the marital right based upon an arm's
length transaction, the value of the transferred property actually should
be determined as of the date of the separation agreement. It is on this
date that the husband and wife are assumed to have agreed that the trans-
ferred property and the marital rights are of equal value. Fluctuations
in value of the property after the agreement should not be taken into ac-
count. There is no necessary correlation betweer the value of trans-
ferred property at the time of the transfer and the -value of marital rights
unless it is considered that the marital rights increase in value along with
increases in the husband's wealth. Although marital rights and trans-
ferred property may be of equal value at the time of the separation agree-
ment, their value may not be equal at the time of transfer due to fluctua-
tions in the value of transferred property subsequejit to the agreement.3 2
32. Bartin, Tax Aspects of Divorce and Property S,'ttlerent Agreements, 16
U.S.C. TAx INSTITUTE 421, 437 (1964) and Kilbourn, PivzzVng Problems in Property
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Wife's Basis
The main impact of the Davis decision was that the husband realized
a taxable gain upon the transfer of appreciated property to his wife. As
a necessary corollary to this conclusion, the Court found that the wife
realized no gain on the transfer. This inescapably follows from the
valuation of the wife's marital rights as equal in value to the transferred
property.
For the same reasons, the Court found that her basis for the property
was the fair market value of that property at the time of the transfer.
Section 1012 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provides that the basis
of property shall be the cost of such property. The wife's cost was the
value of the marital rights which she relinquished. Since the Court held
that the marital rights are equal in value to the fair market value of the
transferred property as of the date of transfer, the wife's basis for the
property received was the fair market value of that property. In these
situations, the wife certainly receives a tax advantage by taking this basis,
but there appears to be no alternative basis to give her consistent with the
Davis rationale.
Nontaxable Exchanges
Section 1034 is important to the problem of property settlements
when the family residence has appreciated in value and is transferred to
the wife in satisfaction of marital obligations. Section 1034(a) pro-
vides that if the taxpayer sells his principal residence and purchases and
uses a new home as his principal residence within one year of the sale of
the former residence, the gain from the sale is recognized only to the ex-
tent that the adjusted sales price of the old residence exceeds the cost of
purchasing the new home. Section 1034(c) (1) provides that for the
purposes of this section an exchange by the taxpayer of his residence for
other property is treated as a sale of the residence. Thus, by the pur-
chase of a new home within a year from the exchange of the old home, it
is possible for the husband to avoid all gain on the transfer of the resi-
dence to the wife in exchange for the release of her marital rights, though
section 1034(e) requires the basis of the new residence to be reduced by
the unrecognized gain on the old residence. However, in many cases the
husband would not be able to take advantage of this provision since it
requires that he buy another home within a year of the sale and use it as
his chief residence. A divorced or separated husband who does not con-
Settlenwts-The Tax Anatomy of Divorce, 27 Mo. L. REv. 354 (1962) likewise criti-
cize this method of valuation.
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template marriage in the near future might not find it feasible to pur-
chase a new residence for his use.
Non taxable Division of Property
If property is transferred pursuant to a division of the property
among co-owners, then no gain is recognized since the transferee is merely
receiving what he already owns.33 The husband in the Davis case argued
that the transfer of appreciated stock to his wife in release of marital
rights was a division of property among co-owners and consequently was
not a taxable event. The Court rejected this argument and held that the
transfer was not part of a division of property. The legal title to the
stock transferred rested solely in the husband. Under the law of Dela-
ware, the state of matrimonial domicile, the only interest which the wife
had in the stock was a right under intestacy laws to one-third of the hus-
band's property if he predeceased her and the right tpon divorce to what-
ever share of the husband's property the divorce court would grant her
in its discretion. The Court stated that the rights of the wife in the
stock transferred to her were not those of a co-owner but merely "in-
choate rights" arising from the marital relation. 4 It conceded that if the
wife's interest in the transferred property had been an interest in the
nature of a co-owner as in community property states rather than simply
"inchoate rights," the transfer would have been treated as a nontaxable
division of property among co-owners. It is obviously important to de-
termine what interest the wife must have in the property to elevate her
rights in it from an "inchoate" right to the rights oi a co-owner.
In emphasizing that the wife's rights in trans erred property were
not those of a co-owner the Court stated:
. . . the inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's prop-
erty by the Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity
of ownership. The wife has no interest-pas3ive or active-
over the management or disposition of her husband's personal
property. Her rights are not descendable, and she must survive
him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the
marriage she shares in the property only to such extent as the
court deems "reasonable" . . . Delaware seems only to place a
burden on the husband's property rather than to make the wife a
part owner thereof. In the present context the ,'ights of succes-
sion and reasonable share do not differ significantly from the
33. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 69-67 (1962); C. C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908
(1946).
34. 370 U.S. at 70.
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husband's obligations of support and alimony. They all partake
more of a personal liability of the husband than a property in-
terest of the wife. The effectuation of these marital rights may
ultimately result in the ownership of some of the husband's
property as it did here, but certainly this happenstance does not
equate the transaction with a division of property by co-
owners."5 (Emphasis added.)
It appears from the above statement that the crux of the Court's charac-
terization of the wife's rights as merely "inchoate" rather than the rights
of a co-owner is that her rights were more of a personal liability against
the husband rather than an interest in the property. Her rights were
more analogous to those of a creditor who has a lien upon the husband's
property to satisfy a personal obligation-here the duty of support-than
to those of a part owner of the property.
In Indiana the wife's marital rights are substantially the same as
were those of the wife in the Davis case. She merely has the right of
intestate succession and upon divorce the right to whatever portion of the
husband's property the court finds reasonable.36 The Indiana statutes
impose a burden upon the husband's property rather than make her a part
owner in his property. However, from this alone it cannot be assumed
that the same result as in Davis would be reached under Indiana law.
Even though the wife has no legal interest in the husband's property dur-
ing the marriage, the Indiana courts treat allocation of alimony as a divi-
sion of property.37 The Indiana Supreme Court in Shula v. Shula s
stated:
Alimony is awarded in Indiana for the purpose of making a
present and complete settlement of the property rights of the
parties. It does not include future support to the wife...
The primary factor in fixing alimony is the existing property
of the parties.
The rule followed for this "division of property" is to give the wife the
same sum as she would receive if her husband died intestate. Thus, as a
35. Ibid.
36. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-202-3 (Burns 1953). The Indiana statutes create no
estate in the husband's property in the wife during the husband's lifetime, but merely
an inchoate and contingent interest which depends upon her survivorship and is ex-
tinguished if she predeceases him. Taylor v. Voss, 271 U.S. 176 (1926).
37. Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 132 N.E.2d 612 (1956); Temme v. Temme, 103
Ind. App. 569, 9 N.E.2d 111 (1937).
38. 235 Ind. 210, 214 (1956).
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rule of thumb, she is awarded one-third of the husband's property.39 It
is quite conceivable that a result contrary to Davis would be reached under
Indiana law which treats transfers of property incident to divorce as a
division of property.
It appears that if appreciated property which is transfered by the
husband to the wife in release of her marital rights is held by them as
tenants in common, as joint tenants, or as tenants by the entirety, the
transfer is a nontaxable division of property among co-owners.
It is indisputable that a transfer to the wife of property held by the
husband and wife as tenants in common would be a nontaxable division
of property among co-owners. Tenancy in common is the epitome of
co-ownership. Each tenant has an undivided one-half legal interest in
the property which is descendable and which may be independently as-
signed. Each tenant has the power of management over the whole prop-
erty and the right to receive his proportionate share of the profits from
the property.
Although there is less certainty, it appears that property held by the
spouses as joint tenants and tenants by the entirety would be considered
to be owned by the husband and wife as co-owners so that its transfer to
the wife would be considered a nontaxable division of property between
co-owners. When the wife is the joint tenant or tenant by entirety over
transferred property, she has an interest very different from the interest
of the wife in the Davis case. In the Davis case, the legal title to the
property in question rested exclusively in the husband, and the wife's
only interest was an inchoate interest which arose by virtue of the mari-
tal relation. The Court in Davis stressed that the wife had no present
right in the transferred property and that her interest was basically a
mere personal liability against the husband. But when the wife is a joint
tenant or tenant by entirety, her interest in the p:operty is not in the
nature of a personal liability upon the husband. It is not merely a burden
upon the husband's property, but is a present legal interest in the property
itself. Her interest in the property is completely independent of her hus-
band's duty to support her. Her interest is not ',aised merely by the
operation of the intestacy laws, but is derived from the conveyance to her
of legal title in the property itself.
The conclusion that the husband and wife are co-owners when they
hold property as joint tenants or tenants by entirety is fortified by the in-
come tax treatment of the husband and wife on income-producing property
39. Temme v. Temnme, 103 Ind. App. 569, 9 N.E.2d 111 (1937) ; Glick v. Glick, 86
Ind. App. 593, 159 N.E. 33 (1927). This rule does not apply to property held by the
entirety or otherwise with the right of survivorship. Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 215,
132 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1956).
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held as joint tenants. When the husband and wife hold property as joint
tenants 40 or as tenants by entirety,4' they each report one-half of the in-
come and receive one-half of the sales price of the property if state law
provides that they share equally. Also under Section 116 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 the husband and wife are each allowed the $100
exclusion from dividends received on stock held by them jointly. Since
the income from property ordinarily follows ownership42 and since the
husband and wife may each report one-half of the income from property
held by them jointly or by entirety, it may be concluded that for tax pur-
poses they are co-owners of property so held.43 This conclusion is further
fortified by the fact that joint tenants and tenants by the entirety are
afforded the same income tax treatment as tenants in common. It has
been suggested that an equal division of property held by spouses in
non-community property states as joint tenants, tenants by entirety, or
tenants in common will not be a taxable event, but there are no published
rulings or decisions on this question.44
Even if it is concluded that the husband and wife as joint tenants or
tenants by entirety are not co-owners for purposes of a nontaxable divi-
sion of property, property held under such tenancies prior to divorce
which is transferred to the wife can still qualify as a nontaxable division
of property if the separation agreement is properly drafted. In the sepa-
ration agreement the parties should specify that the property shall not be
transferred to the wife until after a final decree of absolute divorce is
awarded. Since a decree of absolute divorce dissolves the tenancy by
entirety or joint tenancy and converts it into a tenancy in common,"' at
the time of the transfer the husband and wife would hold the property as
tenants in common and the transfer would be a division of property among
co-owners, at least to the extent of the wife's one-half interest in the
property.46
40. Rul. 16-12109, I.T. 3754, Cum. BULL. 1945, p. 143.
41. Rul. 7-12773, I.T. 3898, Cum. BULL. 1948-1, p. 55; I.T. 3796, Cum. BULL.
1936-1, p. 88.
42. 3 CCH 1966 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 303.01.
43. In opposition to this conclusion is § 2040 of the 1954 Code which provides that
the total value of property held jointly is included in the estate of a deceased tenant ex-
cept to the extent that its value is attributable to contributions of the other tenant. But
because of their different objectives, the estate tax provisions and the income tax provi-
sions are not always compatible.
44. 4 CCH 1965 STAND. FED. TAX RP. 1 3390.01.
45. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1218 (Burns 1965).
46. This same result could be reached by transferring the property to the wife as
a tenant in common with the husband prior to divorce. But the husband might incur a
gift tax in such a transaction. Also, the conflicting interests of the parties must be





The adverse consequences of Davis upon the transfer of appreciated
property may be avoided if the husband creates a trust which operates as
a conduit for the transmission of payments to his wife to satisfy his duty
to support her. However, caution must be exercised to be certain that
the trust serves merely as a conduit by which payments are made to the
wife rather than a transfer which discharges the wife's marital rights.47
In creating this trust the trust instrument must not provide that the crea-
tion of the trust will satisfy the husband's marital obligations to the wife
since such a provision would be regarded as a transfer of property in
discharge of marital obligations upon which gain would have to be recog-
nized by the husband under the rule of the Davis case. Nor can the trust
provide for the termination of the marital obligations at a subsequent
date prior to the wife's remarriage or death. 8 To preserve the conduit
character of the trust it must also be provided that the husband has a con-
tinuing legal obligation to make support payments to his wife to the ex-
tent that the trust income is insufficient to do so. It is preferable that
the husband be required to pay the additional suppart funds directly to
the wife and that the wife have a right to proceed directly against her
husband to compel such payments for it then seems clear that the hus-
band has not obtained a release from his marital duties and thus would
realize no gain on the transaction. However, if the additional support
funds are not to come from the husband but are to come from the corpus
of the trust and the wife's only recourse to compel payment is against the
trustee to require him to invade corpus in her behalf, it then appears that
the husband has been relieved of his marital obligations by the creation
of the trust and consequently would realize a gain. If in the above situa-
tion the husband has a duty to replenish the corpus m hich can be enforced
by the wife, it would appear that the husband ha3 a continuing legal
obligation to support his wife.
An example of a conduit trust is as follows: the husband transfers
property to an irrevocable trust with the provision that a specified por-
tion of the income be paid to his wife for her life or until her remarriage
with the excess income and corpus irrevocably dedicated to charitable
purposes.4"
There are several advantages to this particular trust. Foremost, the
47. Rev. Rul. 59-47, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 511. The characteristics of the conduit
trust are described in Rev. Rul. 57-506, 1957-8 Cum. BULL. 65.
48. Rev. Rul. 57-507, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 65.
49. This example was given in Rev. Rul. 57-506 supra note 47 and in Note, The
Tax Consequences of Divorce and Property Settlement, 1963 DUKE L.J. 365.
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husband does not realize any gain on the excess of the fair market value
of the property at the time of the transfer over its adjusted basis since the
property was not transferred in exchange for the release of his wife's
marital rights, i.e., there was no amount realized by the husband. Further-
more, under section 71 (d) the payments made from the trust to the wife
are included in her gross income and excluded from the husband's gross
income, though the husband cannot deduct these payments under section
215 because they are not included in this income. In addition, in the year
in which the trust was created the husband can claim an income tax
charitable deduction under section 170 for an amount equal to the value
of the transferred property less the value of the wife's right to income
from the trust.
However, there are two major disadvantages of the conduit trust.
Under section 2036 a portion of the corpus of the trust equal to the pro-
portionate part of the trust income paid to the wife will be included in
the husband's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes since the trust
income is to be devoted to the discharge of a legal obligation of the hus-
band which is regarded as equivalent to the retention by the husband of a
life estate in the corpus of the trust. But the provision of the trust which
conveys the trust corpus to charity may to a large extent offset the ad-
verse effect of section 2036 since the value of the remainder can be de-
ducted from the gross estate under section 2055 as a charitable deduc-
tion.5" The second disadvantage is that the husband will incur a gift tax
upon the creation of the trust since he receives no consideration in ex-
change for the payments to his wife. The husband cannot look to section
2516 for relief from gift tax liability since the conduit trust does not
meet the requirement of that section that the property be transferred in
satisfaction of marital rights.
In determining whether to use the conduit trust, the disadvantage of
the gift tax must be weighed against the advantage of avoidance of the
capital gains tax. But if appreciation in value of the transferred property
is small in relation to its value at the time of creation of the trust, then
the gift tax may be greater than the capital gains tax. In this situation
it would be to the husband's benefit not to use the conduit trust, but to
transfer the property to his wife in release of her marital rights and pay
the capital gains tax. Also, in determining whether to use the conduit
trust the advantage of avoiding the capital gains tax should be weighed
against the prospect of the husband's future liability to his wife for ad-
ditional funds in the event the corpus's income is not sufficient to sup-
50. Ibid. See 17 J. TAXATION 301 (1962).
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port her. Careful selection of the property to comprise the corpus can
greatly minimize the prospect of such future liability.
Deductibility of Loss on Transfer of Depreciated Property to Wife
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Davis held that where prop-
erty is transferred by the husband to the wife in discharge of her marital
rights, it must be assumed, where the value of the marital rights is not
otherwise ascertainable, that the parties dealt at arm's length and that
they considered the marital rights and the transferred property to be of
equal value. A question remains whether this rule would apply to a situa-
tion where depreciated property rather than appreciated property, as in
the Davis case, is transferred to the wife. In other words, can the hus-
band rely upon Davis' equal value assumption to claim a loss on the trans-
fer of property in the settlement of his marital obligations? There ap-
pears to be no reason why the rule of Davis would not apply to transfers
of depreciated property. If the marital rights are assumed to be equal
in value to the transferred property in order that gain on the transfer
may not escape taxation, they should also be so valed in order to afford
relief for a loss upon the transfer. To hold otherwise would be un-
conscionable.
Even if the husband is able to rely upon Davis to show that a loss
has been sustained on the transfer of depreciated property to his wife, he
still faces several barriers to deduction of such losses. Section 165, which
authorizes the deduction of losses in general, does not allow deduction
for losses on property held for personal use. Thus, a loss upon transfer
of the family residence or auto to the wife would not be deductible by the
husband. However, he would be permitted to deduct a loss incurred upon
the transfer to the wife of stock, bonds, or other income-producing prop-
erty since section 165 permits deduction for losses sustained in the sale
or exchange of property used in the taxpayer's trade or business or of
property held for the production of income.
However, even if the deduction is allowed by section 165, the hus-
band must overcome another possible barrier to the deduction of the loss
posed by section 267. This section provides that no deduction shall be
allowed for losses on sales or exchanges of property between members of
the same family. The purpose of this section is to prevent the deduction
of artificial losses on transfers of property which remains in the family.5
It is aimed at transfers which are made for no valid reason other than to
establish a deductible loss. It does not appear that transfers of property
from the husband to his wife pursuant to a divorce settlement would be
51. McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
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within the scope of section 267 since the property will not remain in the
husband's family but will go to one who is no longer, or shortly will not
be, his spouse. The husband is not motivated solely by the purpose of
establishing artificial losses in order to claim a deduction, but rather
transfers the property to satisfy his marital obligations. It is a transfer
made under compulsion of the divorce situation. There may not even
have been any agreement between the husband and wife as to the trans-
fer, but it may have been ordered by the divorce court. In such a situa-
tion there is no opportunity for collusion between the parties to create an
artificial loss for the husband and so section 267 should be completely
inapplicable. 2
There are two methods by which the possible pitfalls of section 267
might be avoided. First, the depreciated property might be sold to an
outsider with the proceeds of the sale used to satisfy the wife's marital
rights." Secondly, the separation agreement might be drafted so that
the transfer of the depreciated property must occur after the divorce is
final and the parties are no longer husband and wife. One possible way
in which this could be accomplished is to make the separation agreement
expressly conditioned upon (1) the granting of a final decree of divorce,
(2) the incorporation of the agreement into the divorce decree, and
(3) a specific order of the court directing the transfer set out in the
agreement to be effectuated."
Deductibility of Legal Expenses
Ordinarily section 262 prevents the deduction of legal expenses in-
curred by the husband to contest a divorce action because they are mere
personal expenses. The provision under which a claim for deduction of le-
gal expenses must be founded is section 212 (2) which provides ". . . there
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year . . . (2) for the management,
conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of in-
come." It has been argued that legal fees incurred by the husband in
property settlement negotiations and divorce proceedings to protect his
income-producing property against the claims of his wife are within the
52. The Tax Court so held in David Pulliam, 39 T.C. 883 (1963). In that case
the divorce court had ordered the husband to transfer a farm to the wife which had
depreciated in value since its acquisition by the husband. There had been no separation
agreement providing for the transfer. The Tax Court permitted the husband to deduct
the loss on the transfer of the farm to his wife in discharge of his marital obligations.
53. This procedure was suggested in Bartin, Tax Aspects of Divorce and Property
Settlement Agreements, 16 U.S.C. TAX INSTITUTE 421 (1964).
54. This provision was suggested in Weinstein & Walzer, Tax Aspects of Di-
vorce in Community Property and Noncommunity Property States, 42 TAXES 386 (1964).
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scope of section 212 (2) because they are paid to retain ownership of such
property, i.e., for the conservation of income-producing property." Until
1963 the federal courts were divided on the question of whether such legal
expenses were deductible. For example, in Baer -v. Commissioner6 the
husband received his livelihood from a corporation in which he owned a
controlling interest. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals permitted the
husband to deduct legal expenses incurred by him in effectuating a settle-
ment with his wife in which he retained control of the corporation. The
court, in allowing the deduction, reasoned that the cost of preserving his
interest in the corporation was an expense of "con;erving and maintain-
ing" his income-producing property, since he derived his livelihood from
it. This case and other cases"7 following it have allowed the deduction
of legal expenses only where the wife's claim would destroy the husband's
earning capacity through the loss of a controlling interest in his business,
but they have disallowed the deduction where the husband was threatened
with the loss of a lesser property interest. There is no language in sec-
tion 212 which could support such a distinction. Or( the other hand, some
cases" have repudiated the rationale of cases like Vaer and have refused
to allow such deductions at all, holding that since these expenses are in-
cident to a divorce or separation, a matter which is of a personal nature,
they are nondeductible personal expenses.
This conflict was resolved in 1963 by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Patrick"9 and United States v. Gilmore.6" In
these cases the Court held that legal expenses incurred by the husband in
connection with divorce proceedings are not deductible expenses, even
though they are paid primarily to retain control of income-producing
property. In the Patrick case the husband paid $19,200 in legal fees to
effect a property settlement agreement with his wife under which he re-
tained control of a family publishing business. In the Gilmore case the
husband paid $32,500 in legal fees to protect his controlling stock interest
in an automobile dealership against the community property claims of his
wife in their divorce suit. In disallowing these deductions the Supreme
55. See notes 57-58 infra.
56. 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
57. Hains v. United States, 275 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Owens v. Commissioner,
273 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1959).
58. McMaken v. Hooks, 316 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1963); Smith's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1963); Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1958) ; Richardson v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1956); Tressler v. Com-
missioner, 228 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955); Howard v. Comm'bsioner, 202 F.2d 28 (9th
Cir. 1953) ; Hunter v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Thorne Don-
nelley, 16 T.C. 1196 (1951).
59. 372 U.S. 53 (1963).
60. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
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Court held that the origin and character of the claim in reference to which
an expense is incurred is the controlling test for whether an expense is
deductible, not its potential consequences on the fortunes of the taxpayer.
The Court reasoned that since the claims asserted by a wife in a divorce
action arise from the marital relationship and not from profit-seeking
activities, legal expenses incurred by a husband incident to divorce are
personal expenses and therefore nondeductible."
However, the husband may deduct legal expenses to the extent they
are paid for tax advice in connection with the separation agreement. 2
Thus, the husband's attorney should itemize his fee and specify what por-
tion of it is for tax advice as a very large portion of the legal expenses
may very well be for tax advice and thus be deductible.
The wife can deduct legal expenses paid by her for legal services in
connection with divorce or separation to the extent that they are attribut-
able to the production or collection of amounts includable in her gross
income as alimony payments.63 The Patrick and Gilmore cases held that
the husband cannot deduct legal expenses of his wife paid by him since
these expenses were not incurred by him.
While the Supreme Court in the Gilmore case held that legal ex-
penses incident to divorce litigation to protect title to income-producing
property are not deductible because they are personal in origin, it ex-
pressly declined to decide whether such expenses could be added to the
basis of the income-producing property. The Court stated: ". . . it is
unnecessary to consider further the question suggested by the Govern-
ment: whether that portion of respondent's payments attributable to
litigating the issue of the existence of community property was a capital
expenditure or a personal expense. In neither event would these pay-
ments be deductible from gross income."6  In 1965 this issue was pre-
sented to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. It held that Gilmore was entitled to add to the basis of his
stock those legal expenditures which could be fairly attributed to his ef-
61. This.test adopted by the Supreme Court is supported by a literal reading of §
212(2). Expenses paid for the "conservation of property" refers to expenses paid in
connection with the property itself rather than expenses incurred to retain ownership of
property. Such a reading is consistent with the usual understanding of the meaning of
the term "conservation," which is a physical safeguarding of the property or the pre-
vention of a change in the condition of the property. Herman Ruoff, 30 T.C. 204 (1958).
The Supreme Court's interpretation of § 212 also finds support in the legislative
history of that provision. See H.R. Rep. No. 2333 and discussion in The Tax Conse-
queiwes of Divorce and Property Settlement, supra note 49.
62. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
63. Ruth K. Wild, 42 T.C. 106 (1964) ; Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), aff'd,
191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Barbara B. LeMond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949).
64. United States v. Gilmore, 379 U.S. 39, 52 (1963).
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forts to protect the title of his stock from the claims of his wife in the
divorce action."5 The court stated: "it is a rule virtually as old as the in-
come tax itself that costs incurred in defending or protecting the tax-
payer's claim to ownership of capital assets are capital expenditures, and
not expenses deductible from ordinary income. The rule is equally ap-
plicable to busiess and nonbusiness activity.""0 The Commissioner ap-
peared to concede that under prior case law legal exrenses incurred in de-
fending title to capital assets were capital expenses that could be added to
the basis of the property protected, regardless of the personal nature of
the claim asserted against the property. However, he argued that these
cases were overruled by the Supreme Court in Gilmore and that now ex-
penses incurred in defending title to capital assets can be capitalized only
if the origin and character of the claim against the property is of a busi-
ness nature rather than a personal nature. But, as noted above, the Su-
preme Court in Gilnore expressly declined to render any opinion on this
issue and thus did not reverse prior case law.
It is submitted that the district court was correct in allowing Gil-
more to capitalize his legal expenses of protecting his stock against the
claims of his wife. To disallow the capitalization of such expenses would
cast an undue burden on taxpayers whose title to property is challenged.
65. Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (1965).
66. Ibid. Hughes v. United States, 275 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1960). The court also
cited the following cases which allowed legal fees incurred in protecting capital property
to be added to the basis of the property even though the fees had no relation whatever to
the business operations of the property: Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1958) in which the origin of the suit was an attempt by estranged wife to obtain a prop-
erty settlement; Shipp v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1954) in which the
origin of the suit was a claim by the wife's executor that ccrtain property was com-
munity property; and Commissioner v. Coke, 201 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1953) in which the
origin of the suit was an attempt to recover fraudulently concezled property to a divorce
action.
